The Democratic Republic of Congo banned exports of copper and cobalt concentrate

A decree signed by three ministers and revealed on August 6 requires processing within the country and cuts the annual cobalt quota to less than half of 2024 production — copper reacted immediately in London.

A decree signed by three Congolese government ministries, obtained and reported by Reuters on August 6, bans with immediate effect the export of copper and cobalt concentrate from the Democratic Republic of Congo, replacing the 2023 rules and their exceptions with a broad requirement to process material within the country. The measure follows the regulator Arecoms' withdrawal, on June 29, of unused first-half 2026 cobalt export quotas, redirecting the volume to a state-controlled strategic reserve. For 2026, the total annual cobalt export quota was set at 96,600 tonnes — 87,000 distributed proportionally among producers and 9,600 held under the regulator's discretionary control — a volume representing less than half of what the country produced in 2024.

The most immediate reaction came from the physical market: spot copper on the London Metal Exchange rose as much as 1.8% as soon as the news broke, touching US$14,369.50 a tonne, its highest level since late January — proof of how much the global copper market already prices in any sign that the Congo Basin, by far the world's largest cobalt producer and a growing source of copper, might restrict the flow of raw material out of the country. The detail separating those who suffer little from those who suffer a lot from a measure like this is local processing capacity: Ivanhoe Mines, the international miner most exposed to Congo, already directs concentrate from its Kamoa-Kakula complex to its own on-site smelter or to the Kolwezi smelter, which limits the immediate operational impact on the company. Those without that kind of domestic infrastructure are the first to feel the shock. The quota mechanism also deserves attention: setting aside a share under the regulator's discretionary control — the 9,600 tonnes held by Arecoms — gives the state a negotiating and crisis-response tool that purely proportional quotas wouldn't allow.

Requiring processing within the country of origin before export isn't an isolated Congolese invention — Indonesia already imposed a similar logic on nickel in recent years, forcing the installation of local smelters in exchange for the right to export. When the country that concentrates most of the world's production of a critical mineral decides it wants to capture the value of refining, not just of raw ore, the rest of the chain — from battery makers to industrial buyers — needs to reassess where processed material comes from and how much geopolitical risk is embedded in that supply. For companies and investors exposed to Congo, the practical lesson is direct: having your own smelter or a local processing contract is no longer a competitive advantage, it's a condition for operating without regulatory disruption.